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Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although
it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test
whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts investment
behavior. Over six years, we collect a unique panel of nearly 7,000 observations of probability distributions
provided by top financial executives regarding the stock market. Financial executives are miscalibrated:
realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 38% of the time. We
show that companies with overconfident CFOs use lower discount rates to value cash flows, and that
they invest more, use more debt, are less likely to pay dividends, are more likely to repurchase shares,
and they use proportionally more long-term, as opposed to short-term, debt. The pervasive effect of
this miscalibration suggests that the effect of overconfidence should be explicitly modeled when analyzing
corporate decision-making.
Itzhak Ben-David
The University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business
















A key role of managers is to estimate future unknowns (e.g., demand, cash ﬂows, competition)
and to use these predictions as inputs to design corporate policies. This task is complicated
by overconﬁdence, as psychological evidence indicates that people exhibit overconﬁdence in
predictions, i.e., they forecast probability distributions that are too narrow. This happens
either because people overestimate their ability to predict the future1 or because they un-
derestimate the volatility of random events.2 Despite the importance of this issue, there has
been no wide-scale empirical research that studies the relation between the overconﬁdence
(i.e., miscalibration of beliefs) of managers and the corporate policies they devise.
In this paper we measure the overconﬁdence of managers in a unique sample of 6,901 S&P
500 forecasts made by top U.S. ﬁnancial executives. Our measure of overconﬁdence is based
on miscalibration of beliefs and is operationalized using a method drawn from laboratory
experiments. We link our estimate of executive overconﬁdence to ﬁrm-level archival data
and study how miscalibration is reﬂected in corporate policies. Each quarter from March
2001 to June 2007, we surveyed hundreds of U.S. Chief Financial Oﬃcers (CFOs) and asked
them to predict expected one- and ten-year stock market returns, as well as the 10th and
90th percentiles of the distribution of market returns. We use the narrowness of individual
probability distributions for stock market returns as a proxy for each respondent’s conﬁdence.
By evaluating the same forecasting task across all executives, we can assess whether CFOs
are miscalibrated and this bias can be disentangled from any potential bias in the mean
estimate (what we refer to as optimism). We examine the time-series and cross-sectional
1Surveyed subjects typically provide too-narrow conﬁdence bounds for their predictions (Alpert and Raiﬀa
1982). Researchers also document that experts in a variety of professional ﬁelds overestimate the precision
of their information, e.g., clinical psychologists (Oskamp 1965), and physicians and nurses (Christensen-
Szalanski and Bushyhead 1981, Baumann, Deber, and Thompson 1991).
2Studies have shown that professionals are miscalibrated with regard to estimating the probabilities of
random outcomes, e.g., engineers (Kidd 1970) and entrepreneurs (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg 1988). Re-
lated to our study, von Holstein (1972) documents that investment bankers provide miscalibrated forecasts
of stock market returns; Deaves, L¨ uders, and Schr¨ oder (2005) ﬁnd that stock market forecasters are overcon-
ﬁdent on average and become more overconﬁdent with past successful forecasts, and Bar-Yosef and Venezia
(2006) report that subjects (students and security analysts) in the laboratory exhibit overconﬁdence in their
predictions of future accounting numbers. Deaves, L¨ uders, and Lou (2003) ﬁnd that laboratory subjects who
are miscalibrated also tend to trade excessively.
1determinants of overconﬁdence3 (i.e., the narrowness of the conﬁdence interval), and analyze
the relation between our overconﬁdence measure and a range of corporate policies including
capital spending, mergers and acquisitions, ﬁnancing, and payout.
Recent research examines the relation between corporate policies and managerial biases.
In several papers, Malmendier and Tate measure CEO overconﬁdence as an overestima-
tion of their own ﬁrm’s future returns (feeling “above average”) based on the degree of
under-diversiﬁcation of the executives’ personal portfolios, and also according to the CEOs’
representation in the popular press (Malmendier and Tate 2005b). They show that biased
managers exhibit high investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity (Malmendier and Tate 2005a), en-
gage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate 2007), and
avoid tapping the capital markets (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2006). Using Malmendier
and Tate’s news-based proxy, Hribar and Yang (2006) show that ﬁrms with CEOs who feel
“above average” are more likely to issue point estimates in their earnings forecasts (rather
than estimate ranges), are more likely to issue narrow range estimates, and are more likely
to manage earnings to meet these forecasts.
In contrast, our empirical design allows us to separate overconﬁdence from optimism. We
deﬁne overconﬁdence as a general miscalibration in beliefs (Lichtenstein and Fischoﬀ 1977,
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischoﬀ 1980, Lichtenstein, Fischoﬀ, and Phillips 1982, Kruger and
Dunning 1999, Alba and Hutchison 2000, Shefrin 2001, Soll and Klayman 2004, Hackbarth
2007). According to this deﬁnition, overconﬁdent people overestimate the precision of their
own beliefs, or underestimate the variance of risky processes; in other words, their subjective
probability distributions are too narrow. The speciﬁc interpretation of overconﬁdence is
important particularly when testing theoretical predictions regarding the eﬀects of biases
on corporate policies. Theoretical models distinguish between optimistic managers who
overestimate the mean of their ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows (Shefrin 2001, Heaton 2002, Hackbarth 2007),
which we refer to as optimism, and overconﬁdent managers who either underestimate the
volatility of their ﬁrms’ future cash ﬂows (Shefrin 2001, Hackbarth 2007) or overweight their
3Although we measure relative conﬁdence, we use the term overconﬁdence because the majority of CFOs
provide responses that would be considered overconﬁdent by any reasonable metric, as discussed in Sec-
tion III.
2private signals relative to public information (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2007, Gervais and
Goldstein 2007).4 Our data allow us to disentangle respondents’ biases in the ﬁrst and second
moments, in other words, we can measure miscalibration (overconﬁdence) separately from
optimism. To our knowledge, our paper is the only one with direct and distinct measures of
miscalibration and optimism, and that links both these constructs to ﬁrms and their actions.
Furthermore, our survey provides evidence for a diﬀerent subset of oﬃcers than the
Malmendier and Tate studies do. Our survey respondents are ﬁnance oﬃcers, mostly CFOs.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that there is a pronounced “CFO eﬀect” in corporate
decisions related to investment, acquisitions, capital structure, and payout. Graham, Harvey,
and Puri (2007) present evidence that CFOs play a relatively important role in capital
structure, payout, and capital allocation decisions. Therefore, in this paper, we conduct
experiments that uniquely address whether and how personal characteristics of CFOs aﬀect
these important corporate decisions.
The paper consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, we investigate whether respondent CFOs
are, on average, overconﬁdent in their predictions. According to the conﬁdence bounds that
CFOs provide, they are severely miscalibrated: only 38% of the realized S&P 500 returns
fall within the 80% conﬁdence interval that respondents oﬀer. We document that expected
market returns and conﬁdence bounds depend on recent past market returns and on returns
of the CFOs’ own ﬁrms. Interestingly, the lower conﬁdence bound is far more sensitive to
past market returns than is the upper conﬁdence bound. As a consequence of the diﬀerent
sensitivities, executives are more conﬁdent following periods of high market return and less
conﬁdent following low market returns periods. This behavior is consistent with the argument
of Soll and Klayman (2004) that people make inferences about the distribution of random or
unknown variables from a few known cases (such as past returns), and with Arnold (1986),
March and Shapira (1987) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), who argue that managers
focus on downside risk. In addition, we document that CFO conﬁdence is a time-persistent
personal characteristic that increases with forecasting skill.
4Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) use similar overconﬁdence
deﬁnitions for stock market investors.
3In the second part of the paper, we associate CFO overconﬁdence with a variety of cor-
porate policies. We present a simple model in which overconﬁdent managers underestimate
cash ﬂow volatility, and as a result use low discount rates to value these cash ﬂows. In the
model, an overconﬁdent manager decides ﬁrst about the size of the investment and then
determines the mix of ﬁnancing, given market prices for ﬁnancial claims. The manager
overinvests in projects and generally believes that investors underestimate the value of the
ﬁrm and the value of equity. As a result, the manager prefers to use internal resources
before external sources of ﬁnancing and is less likely to pay dividends. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd that for reasonable modeling assumptions and parameters, debt leverage increases with
overconﬁdence, as does the likelihood of engaging in share repurchases.
The empirical tests corroborate the predictions of the model. First, we ﬁnd that our S&P
500-based overconﬁdence measure is correlated with a ﬁrm-speciﬁc overconﬁdence measure.
That is, managers who provide narrow estimates for the S&P 500 return distribution tend to
estimate very tight distributions for their own ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows. Second, consistent with the
implication that overconﬁdent managers use lower discount rates, we ﬁnd that overconﬁdent
CFOs expect a lower internal rate of return (IRR) for their ﬁrms’ projects. Third, we
document that ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers (based on their S&P 500 predictions) invest
more in capital expenditures and in acquiring other ﬁrms. Moreover, the market reaction
to these acquisitions is negative on average. Fourth, ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers
have higher leverage. Fifth, these ﬁrms are less likely to pay dividends and more likely to
repurchase shares.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II details the method that we use to col-
lect the overconﬁdence data, the construction of variables, and it presents some summary
statistics. In Section III, we provide evidence on the miscalibration in CFO expectations.
Section IV explores the determinants of overconﬁdence. Section V presents a simple model
of overconﬁdence and corporate policies, and derives empirical predictions. Section VI tests
the predictions of the model in data on corporate policies. Some concluding remarks are
oﬀered in Section VII.
4II. Data
A. Executive Survey
Our study is based on a unique data set of stock market predictions made by senior ﬁnance
executives, the majority of whom are CFOs and ﬁnancial vice presidents, collected in 26
quarterly surveys conducted by Duke University between March 2001 and June 2007. Each
quarter, we poll between 2,000 and 3,000 ﬁnancial oﬃcers with a short survey on important
topical issues (Graham and Harvey 2006). The usual response rate for the quarterly survey
is 5% to 8% and most of the responses arrive within the ﬁrst two days of the survey invitation
date.5 The survey usually contains eight questions about the U.S. economy, ﬁrm policies,
and ﬁrm short-term forecasts. Some of the questions are identical for each survey and
some change over time depending on economic conditions. The historical surveys as well as
aggregated responses can be accessed at www.cfosurvey.org.
We base our overconﬁdence proxies on two survey questions. The ﬁrst question is:
“Over the next year, I expect the S&P 500 return will be:
- There is a 1-in-10 chance the actual return will be less than %
- I expect the return to be: %
- There is a 1-in-10 chance the actual return will be greater than %”
The second question is similar but relates to annualized stock market return forecasts over
the next 10 years. The initial words change from “Over the next year, I expect the S&P 500
return will be” to “Over the next 10 years, I expect the average annual S&P 500 return will
be”.6
In contrast to most studies that use survey data, we are able to examine the characteristics
of a sizable fraction of the respondents. Although the survey does not require CFOs to
5The bulk of our tests exploit variation within the respondent group, yet the overall response rate of 5%
to 8% could potentially lead to non-response bias in the inference of some tests (e.g., in Section III). We
explore this issue further in Section II.E.
6The ﬁrst question appeared in the surveys in its current form starting 2001Q2. The second question has
been asked in its current form since 2002Q1. In the earliest surveys, executives were asked only for their
expected returns.
5provide identifying information, about half of the ﬁrms voluntarily provide such information,
and about a quarter of the ﬁrms are conﬁrmed to be U.S. public ﬁrms. Overall, our sample
includes 6,901 one-year expected returns and 6,280 ten-year expected returns with valid 10th
and 90th percentile information. Of this sample, 2,653 observations are from public ﬁrms
(self-reported), and of them, we are able to match 2,262 observations (858 unique ﬁrms) to
CRSP and Compustat. For the analysis in Section VI, we exclude utility ﬁrms (2-digit SIC
code 49) and ﬁnancial ﬁrms (2-digit SIC code 60 to 69), and require respondents to respond
to the optimism questions (see Section II.C below), leaving 1,421 observations (594 unique
ﬁrms). For 1,104 observations (504 unique ﬁrms) there is a full set of survey responses and
accounting data.
B. Measures of Overconﬁdence
Our overconﬁdence measure maps each CFO’s 10th and 90th percentile predictions into an
individual probability distribution for each respondent. Wide distributions reﬂect high sub-
jective uncertainty about the estimated variable, while narrow distributions reﬂect subjective
conﬁdence. We use the method proposed by Davidson and Cooper (1976) to recover respon-
dent i’s individual probability distribution, based on the normal distribution. The imputed





where x(0.90) and x(0.10) represent the 90th and 10th percentile of the respondent’s dis-
tribution, and Z is the number of standard deviations within the conﬁdence interval. For
conﬁdence intervals of 80% in a normal distribution, Z equals 2.65. Keefer and Bodily (1983)
show that, given information about the 90th and 10th percentiles, this simple approximation
is the preferred method for estimating the standard deviation of a probability distribution
of a random variable.
6Our desired overconﬁdence variable is a relative measure that is independent of CFOs’
opinions about the future level of the stock market.7 To disentangle the tightness of con-
ﬁdence bounds from the level of expected returns and contemporaneous market eﬀects, we
use a double-sorting procedure. This procedure allows us to measure the narrowness of
CFOs’ conﬁdence intervals with respect to the conﬁdence intervals of other CFOs who hold
similar beliefs about the expected stock market returns at the same point in time. First,
for each survey date, we form groups (deciles) based on expected returns. Then, within
each group, we sort again and form deciles based on the size of conﬁdence intervals.8 We
use this procedure to generate two overconﬁdence variables, one short-term and one long-
term. Overconﬁdence ST is the short-term overconﬁdence measure and is based on one-year
forecasts of the S&P 500. Overconﬁdence LT is the long-term overconﬁdence measure, anal-
ogously based on the ten-year forecasts. To ease interpretation of the results, we orthogo-
nalize the long-term overconﬁdence variable against the short-term overconﬁdence variable
and scale them so that they have values between 0 and 1.
C. Attitudes Towards the Stock Market, U.S. Economy, and the
CFOs’ Own Firms
Our survey data have the advantage of allowing for the measurement of overconﬁdence while
controlling for potential optimism in expected returns. We create two optimism variables,
Optimism ST and Optimism LT, based on expected one- and ten-year return forecasts,
respectively. The optimism variables are formed using a procedure that parallels the con-
struction of the overconﬁdence variables.
In addition, we are also interested in isolating the eﬀects of overconﬁdence from other,
potentially correlated, attitudes about the U.S. economy and about the CFOs’ own ﬁrms.
7For example, CFOs who are bullish about the stock market may also anticipate high volatility and thus
provide wide conﬁdence intervals because they believe that the direction of the stock market is related to
volatility, and not because they have low conﬁdence.
8Our results are qualitatively the same if, instead of the double-sorting procedure, we decile rank re-
spondents according to their conﬁdence interval scaled by their expected returns. The non-parametric
double-sorting procedure that we use has the advantage of not imposing a linear relation between conﬁdence
intervals and expected returns.
7In particular, it is plausible that managers who exhibit overconﬁdence are also optimistic
about the future of their ﬁrms. Alternatively, it is possible that managers who anticipate a
bright future for their ﬁrms feel more conﬁdent. In these two cases, our tests might capture
the eﬀects of the covariates of overconﬁdence, rather than the direct eﬀect of overconﬁdence.
To address this concern, in addition to using Optimism ST or LT, which are based on the
expected returns of the stock market, we introduce additional controls for optimism about
the U.S. economy (Optimism U.S.) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc optimism (Optimism ﬁrm), based on
two questions that appear in most surveys.9 The questions are:
“a. Rate your optimism about the U.S. economy on a scale from 0-100, with 0
being the least optimistic and 100 being the most optimistic.
b. Rate your optimism about the ﬁnancial prospects for your company on a scale
from 0-100, with 0 being the least optimistic and 100 being the most optimistic.”
To facilitate the interpretation of these variables, we decile-rank them within a given quarter’s
survey, orthogonolize them, and scale them so that they have values between 0 and 1.
D. Firm Data
Throughout the analysis, we use several databases with ﬁrm-level information. A detailed
description of the variables is provided in Appendix A. First, we retrieve accounting data
from Compustat, including industry classiﬁcation, book leverage, asset market-to-book ra-
tio, proﬁtability, ﬁve-year sales growth, collateralized assets, capital expenditures scaled by
lagged assets, cash spent on acquisitions scaled by lagged assets, and indicator variables for
repurchases and dividend payments. We merge the survey observations with annual Compu-
stat data, matching by the nearest ﬁscal end-of-year date. Second, we use CRSP to compute
one-year past returns for the market and ﬁrms; in addition, we use CRSP to approximate
9We have responses for these questions for about 85% of the identiﬁed observations (excluding three
surveys: 2001Q4, 2002Q1, 2005Q1).
8ﬁrm age. Third, we use merger transactions data and information about acquired targets
from Thomson SDC Platinum.10
E. Summary Statistics
In Table I, Panels A through D, we present summary statistics for survey responses and the
characteristics of the respondent ﬁrms. Panel A presents a broad proﬁle of the sample (ﬁrm
data are for non-utilities and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms). The annual sales of the median ﬁrm is
$2.1bn. The average asset market-to-book ratio (M/B) is 1.48, and the average annualized
ﬁve-year sales growth rate is 9.4%. Proﬁtability (operating proﬁt scaled by lagged total
assets) averages 13.4% and capital expenditure intensity (capital expenditures scaled by
lagged total assets) averages 8.0%. 58.2% of the ﬁrms pay dividends and 41.6% repurchase
their own shares. Respondents come from a balanced range of industries (Table I, Panel B).
In Panel C we compare the attributes of the portion of our sample for which we have
Compustat data to the attributes of the pooled population of Compustat ﬁrms between 2001
and 2006. Overall, our sample ﬁrms are more established and advanced in their life cycle
than most Compustat ﬁrms. In particular, respondent ﬁrms are relatively mature and large:
49.7% of the identiﬁed ﬁrms in our sample are from the top ﬁrm-age quintile of Compustat
ﬁrms and 61.7% are from the top sales quintile of Compustat ﬁrms. It is not surprising
that our procedure of matching responses to Compustat ﬁrms ﬁnds successful matches more
often for mature and large companies. In other characteristics, such as market-to-book
ratio, past sales growth, and debt, our sample ﬁrms are similar to the universe of Compustat
ﬁrms. Overall, based on the portion of our respondents that we can link to Compustat, our
sample appears to over-represent large and mature ﬁrms, and therefore our results should
be interpreted with this in mind.
10To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers and following the practice of many studies using
similar data, we winsorize our survey data within each survey date at the 1% level. Similarly, we winsorize
Compustat and CRSP data.
9III. Are CFOs Overconﬁdent?
In this section we conduct two tests to assess whether CFO respondents are, on average,
overconﬁdent. There could be two reasons for CFO overconﬁdence. First, as discussed in
the introduction, previous studies in psychology have almost unanimously shown that peo-
ple, and professionals in particular, are overconﬁdent on average. Second is a compelling
argument by Goel and Thakor (2008). They argue that top executives should be expected
to be overconﬁdent because promotion in corporations is typically based on past perfor-
mance, which is ultimately tied to the risk taken by executives. Overconﬁdent managers
underestimate risk and therefore take actions with excessive risk. As a consequence, the
variance of outcomes from their actions is greater, and therefore overconﬁdent managers will
be over-represented among the right-tail “winners” and are more likely to get promoted.
We perform two tests to investigate whether CFOs are overconﬁdent. The ﬁrst test
measures the fraction of ex post S&P 500 return realizations that fall between the 10th and
90th percentiles provided by CFOs’ predictions. The second test compares the individual
volatility imputed from the survey data to the individual volatility as predicted by a simple
model of bias.
A. Method I: Ex Ante Predictions vs. Ex Post Realizations
We begin by calculating CFO overconﬁdence as miscalibration of beliefs. We compute the
percentage of executives for whom the realized return of the stock market falls within their
80% conﬁdence intervals, as derived from the 10th and 90th percentile survey responses. If
executives are well-calibrated and our sample period is representative, we expect this ﬁgure
to be 80%.
Table II presents the response statistics per survey. We list the survey means for the
lower conﬁdence bounds (column (1)), expected returns (column (2)), and upper conﬁdence
bounds (column (3)) for the one-year forecasts. In column (4) we present the mean of the
individual volatilities where each is computed using Equation (1), and column (5) contains
10the disagreement volatility (dispersion of beliefs), which is calculated as the standard devi-
ation of expected returns across all respondents for any given date. Similarly, we present
the results for the ten-year forecasts starting in column (6). Finally, we report market data
in columns (11) to (13): realized returns and volatility for the forecasted horizon, and the
VIX11 for the survey date.
Table III compares the S&P 500 forecasts to realizations. In column (1) we calculate the
average forecast error (the diﬀerence between mean expected returns from Table II, column
(2), and the S&P 500 return realization in column (11)). The mean forecast error is 1.4%.
In columns (2) to (4) of Table III we compute for each survey cohort the percentage
of CFOs for whom the S&P 500 realization was in the 80% conﬁdence interval. We judge
whether CFOs are miscalibrated by examining whether ex post market realizations fall in the
ex ante conﬁdence intervals. Over the sample period, only 37.9% of the stock market return
realizations are within the 80% conﬁdence bounds estimated by CFOs (see column (3) and
Figure 1). This degree of miscalibration is not unusual for studies that request respondents
to estimate 80% conﬁdence bounds (Lichtenstein, Fischoﬀ, and Phillips 1982, Russo and
Schoemaker 1992, Klayman, Soll, Gonz´ ales-Vallejo, and Barlas 1999, Soll and Klayman
2004). Thus, based on a miscalibration deﬁnition, CFOs as a group are overconﬁdent in our
sample.
B. Method II: Model of Bias
Next, we consider a simple model of forecasting that allows us to assess ex ante whether
CFOs are overconﬁdent. With the model, we assess the tightness of CFO conﬁdence intervals
without needing to compare forecasts to outcomes (as in the Section III.A). This procedure
helps us assess whether ten-year stock market forecasts are too tight (even though ex post
realizations are not yet available), and also provides additional tightness benchmarks for the
one-year forecasts. In particular, we test whether the 10th and 90th percentiles provided by
11VIX is an index that reﬂects the average of imputed volatility across traded options in the S&P 500
futures index, traded in the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).
11CFOs match anticipated volatility, as well as whether they are calibrated to historical S&P
500 volatility.
We assume that the true model of the S&P 500 returns is:
rSP = µSP + ˜ SP, (2)
where µSP is the unobservable mean return, and the error term ˜ SP ∼ N(0,σ2
SP).
Forecaster i believes that the future return of the S&P 500 is
ˆ ri = ˆ µi + ˆ i, (3)
where ˆ µi is the mean return estimate, and i is a forecaster-speciﬁc error term. The forecaster
does not know the unobservable mean return of the stock market µSP, instead she believes
that
ˆ µi = µSP + ¯ e + ˆ ei, (4)
where ¯ e potentially captures a systematic bias in beliefs about the mean. If ¯ e > 0 then fore-
casters are on average optimistic. The error term ˆ ei captures the uncertainty that forecaster
i has about the mean, and ˆ ei ∼ N(0,σ2
e). For simplicity, we assume mutual independence
between ˆ ei and ˆ i.
The forecaster-speciﬁc error term ˆ i is assumed to be normally distributed ˆ i ∼ N(0,σ2
SP+
θi). The additional term θi potentially captures underestimation (θi < 0) or overestimation
(θi > 0) of stock market volatility. This parameter corresponds with the deﬁnition of over-
conﬁdence as an underestimation of the volatility of random process (as in Hackbarth 2007).





SP + θi + σ
2
e. (5)
12In the context of our survey, we interpret the CFO responses as the mean and the 10th and
90th percentiles of the return distribution ˆ ri, from which we can extract the total variance
ˆ σ2
i.
B.1. Model Calibration: Are CFOs Optimistic?
Using the survey data, we calibrate some of the parameters of the model. We estimate
whether CFOs are optimistic on average with respect to the S&P 500 by examining whether
their forecast errors (expected returns minus realized returns) are signiﬁcantly greater than
zero. The forecast error, therefore, is:
¯ e = E[ˆ ri] − µSP. (6)
Forecast errors are presented in Table III, column (1). The average forecast error is positive
but insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: ¯ e = 1.4% (t = 0.29).12 Hence, expected returns
provided by the CFOs are unbiased within the sample period.
B.2. Model Calibration: Are CFOs Overconﬁdent?
We ﬁrst assess whether CFOs are overconﬁdent in the short-term. For each survey we
estimate the mean bias about the variance, ¯ θ, across agents:







We estimate E[ˆ σ2
i] as the mean of the individual variances in each survey, averaged across
surveys (0.0036), and σ2
e as the variance of point estimates across forecasters, averaged across
surveys (0.0015). We use three diﬀerent proxies for the variance of the stock market, σ2
SP,
based on: (1) market expectation of future stock market variance, averaged across surveys13
12All our statistical inferences adjust for overlapping periods, using Newey and West (1987).
13Based on the VIX index (see Table II, column (13)). The mean annual variance imputed by the VIX
over the sample period was 0.0424 (20.6% in standard deviation terms).
13(0.0424), (2) realized stock market variance, averaged across surveys14 (0.0264), and (3)
historical stock market variance15 (0.0201).
Even if we pick the most conservative (lowest) estimate for the variance of the stock mar-
ket, drawn from historical statistics, CFOs underestimate the variance of the stock market
by E[¯ θ] = −0.0180 (t = −69.9) (−13.4% in standard deviation terms). Therefore, CFOs are
overconﬁdent as a group according to the short-term miscalibration deﬁnition.
Next, we assess ex ante whether CFOs are overconﬁdent in the long term. To do so, we
calibrate Equation (7) for long-term overconﬁdence. We estimate E[ˆ σ2
i] as the mean of the
individual variances, averaged across surveys (0.0015), and σ2
e as the mean of the variance
of point estimates, averaged across surveys (0.0007) (both are annualized). We use two
estimates for the ten-year stock market variance, σ2
SP, both based on historical realizations:
(1) the average annualized stock market variance across all ten-year windows from 1950
to 2006 (0.0209), and (2) the lowest annualized stock market variance across all ten-year
windows since 1950 (0.0129).
The results indicate that CFOs in our sample are overconﬁdent in the long term. When
using the average stock market variance for the calculation, the bias in the perceived variance
of stock market returns is ¯ θ = −0.0200 (−14.2% in standard deviation terms). Based on
the lowest stock market variance in any given ten year window, CFOs still underestimate
the variance by ¯ θ = −0.0121 (−11.0% in standard deviation terms). This bias is depicted
in Figure 3. The top histogram presents the distribution of annualized ten-year historical
market volatilities; the bottom histogram presents the distribution of the corresponding
survey-imputed volatilities. While historical ten-year volatilities are concentrated between
11% and 16%, almost the entire distribution of survey-based volatilities is below 10%.
14The mean of the squared one-year realized volatility (measured using daily returns): 0.0264 (16.3% in
standard deviation terms; see Table II, column (12)).
15The variance of the S&P 500 is the mean of all historical one-year windows of realized variance of the
S&P 500 between January 1950 and December 2006, 0.0201 (14.2% in standard deviation terms). The
historical distributions of the one-year volatilities are illustrated in Figure 2. In the top chart we present the
histogram of the distribution of one-year historical volatilities of the S&P 500. In the bottom panel of the
ﬁgure we provide the histogram of imputed survey volatilities for comparison. The histograms indicate that
CFOs anticipate distinctly lower volatilities than those actually experienced over the previous 57 years.
14IV. Determinants of Overconﬁdence
In this section, we investigate which factors aﬀect managerial forecasts, and examine some
candidate variables that could potentially explain temporal and cross-sectional overconﬁ-
dence.
A. Past Market and Firm Performance
There is a theoretical argument that, following good outcomes, people predict narrower
distributions of future events. In a model by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978), decision makers
“learn” about their decision making ability by observing the outcomes of past decisions,
while ignoring exogenous determinants of these outcomes. Following favorable outcomes,
decision makers become more conﬁdent about their judgement through a self-attribution
mechanism, even if the outcome was independent of their prior decisions. In applying this
idea to trading behavior, Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that traders become overconﬁdent
after observing a series of past successes that they attribute to their own abilities. As an
extension of this reasoning, Hilary and Menzly (2006) ﬁnd that security analysts exhibit
greater aggressiveness following successes in predicting earnings.
Table IV explores the relation between one-year survey forecasts and future and past
S&P 500 return realizations.16 In Panel A we regress average forecasts across surveys (lower
bounds, expected returns, and upper bounds), as well as the average imputed individual
volatility, on future and past S&P 500 one-year returns. Since we examine quarterly forecasts
for one-year horizons, we encounter autocorrelations due to overlapping data and therefore
adjust the standard errors for the two-year overlap17 in the data using the Newey and West
(1987) procedure with 7 quarterly lags. The statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on one-year
future S&P returns in columns (1) to (3) indicate that the CFOs’ stock market forecasts are
not associated with future market return realizations.
16For brevity we present only analysis of one-year forecasts. Ten-year forecasts exhibit similar patterns.
Results are available upon request.
17Allowing for data overlap for both one-year past returns and for one-year future returns.
15Interestingly, CFOs are more conﬁdent following periods of high stock market returns.
One-year forecasts are correlated with past S&P 500 returns (columns (1) to (3) in Panel
A). This eﬀect is especially strong on the lower bound (R2 = 0.75) and on the expected
returns that CFOs provide. Since the average conﬁdence upper bounds are not aﬀected
by past returns very much (R2 = 0.14), individual volatility eﬀectively increases following
poor past returns and decreases following periods of high stock market returns (negative
coeﬃcient in column (4) of Panel A).18 This eﬀect is depicted in the 10th and 90th percentiles
(averaged across respondents) shown in Figure 4. In March 2003, the lower conﬁdence
bound was relatively low (−7.0%) because the actual S&P 500 return in the year before the
survey date was exceptionally low (−31.0%). Likewise, the average lower conﬁdence bound
in September 2003 was relatively high (1.1%) because the realized return in the preceding
year was especially high (17.5%). The average upper conﬁdence bound, however, does not
co-move as much with past market returns. These results are consistent with the model
of Gervais and Odean (2001) and with Alba, Hutchison, and Lynch (1991) and Soll and
Klayman (2004), who argue that forecasters rely heavily on past extreme cases to estimate
the distribution of uncertain variables. The lower conﬁdence bound is particularly sensitive
to past returns, perhaps because managers tend to focus on downside risk in their analysis
of projects (Arnold 1986, March and Shapira 1987, Kahneman and Lovallo 1993).
In Panel B of Table IV, we test whether CFO stock market forecasts are inﬂuenced by
idiosyncratic past returns of their own ﬁrms (i.e., the part of their ﬁrm’s return unrelated to
overall market returns). In these regressions, we face cross-sectional correlation (executives
forecast the same index) and overlapping data problems (forecasting horizon is one year and
observations are quarterly). We address the issue by using a Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach in which we perform cross-sectional regressions of forecasts on past one-year ﬁrm
returns.19 Then, we compute the mean of the regressions’ coeﬃcients and adjust the standard
errors with the Newey and West (1987) procedure for three lags. This procedure is also
18These results are in line with Deaves, L¨ uders, and Schr¨ oder (2005), who analyze the forecasts of German
stock market forecasters and with Shefrin (2005), who reports results from the UBS survey of retail investors.
19Since the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure captures common cross-sectional eﬀects (such as market
returns) in the intercepts of the cross-sectional regressions, we eﬀectively control for the market return and
the regression coeﬃcients reﬂect the eﬀect of past ﬁrm idiosyncratic returns on forecasts.
16advantageous because it implicitly demeans ﬁrm returns each quarter, so that the eﬀects
reﬂected in the regressions in Panel B are distinct from the market-wide eﬀects depicted
in the regressions in Panel A. The results suggest that lower return bounds and expected
returns provided by CFOs are associated with their own ﬁrms’ past returns. These results
are consistent with the model of den Steen (2004) in which agents become overconﬁdent after
making decisions and afterwards succeeding. Comparing the results in Panel A to those in
Panel B, we note that the eﬀect of past market-wide returns on the conﬁdence bounds is
larger by an order of magnitude, relative to the eﬀect of past ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns.
B. Personal Characteristics
In this section, we examine the personal determinants of CFO overconﬁdence. In particu-
lar, we explore the persistence of overconﬁdence through time, its relation to demographic
attributes, and its association with skill.
B.1. Persistence of Overconﬁdence
First, we investigate whether overconﬁdence and optimism are persistent characteristics of
decision makers. Across surveys, there are 785 pairs of sequential responses from the same
executives (i.e., respondent from the same ﬁrm with same position in the ﬁrm). For these
observations, the correlation between sequential Overconﬁdence ST (Overconﬁdence LT) is
0.45 (0.29), and the correlation between sequential Optimism ST (Optimism LT) is slightly
lower, 0.35 (0.25). Hence, both optimism and overconﬁdence persist through time for a given
CFO, although overconﬁdence exhibits stronger persistence. These results are consistent with
evidence about the stability of individual biases over time (Jonsson and Allwood 2003, Glaser,
Langer, and Weber 2005).
17B.2. Demographic Proﬁle
Second, we conduct a test that explores the relation between executive biases and demo-
graphic characteristics. We collect demographic details from respondents in two surveys
(2003Q4 and 2004Q1). The questions inquire about age, education, professional experience,
and gender. Our analysis (untabulated) reveals few signiﬁcant relations between overconﬁ-
dence and demographic attributes. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that CFOs with diﬀerent levels of
education and experience express the same degree of overconﬁdence. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant gender eﬀect in overconﬁdence.
B.3. Do Overconﬁdence Variables Capture Skill?
Third, we consider the possibility that our overconﬁdence variables capture skill rather than
miscalibration, i.e., CFOs who forecast the stock market better also provide narrower con-
ﬁdence bounds. To investigate the relation between overconﬁdence and skill we examine
whether overconﬁdent CFOs produce more accurate forecasts. Table V, column (1) presents
regressions of absolute forecast error (as a proxy for skill) on the overconﬁdence variables.
The results indicate that overconﬁdent CFOs predict future stock market returns more pre-
cisely.
However, the tradeoﬀ between the size of conﬁdence intervals and the improvement in
accuracy is less than proportional. When moving from the median to the top decile of
long-term overconﬁdence, the size of the conﬁdence intervals decreases by about 6.5% (unt-
abulated), but the average absolute forecast error decreases only by 0.36% (half of 0.71%,
Table V, column (1)). This diﬀerence in magnitudes implies that miscalibration overshadows
accuracy on net. In other words, although overconﬁdent CFOs are slightly more accurate,
their conﬁdence intervals are still much too narrow.
To formally test this hypothesis, we examine whether the likelihood that a realization
that would fall within the conﬁdence interval is correlated with overconﬁdence, even after
controlling for the absolute forecast error. Thus, we regress an indicator variable of whether
18S&P 500 realizations fall within each individual conﬁdence interval on three variables: the
two individual overconﬁdence measures, and the absolute forecast error. The results indicate
that overconﬁdence plays an important role in explaining the CFOs’ tight conﬁdence inter-
vals. If skill (low forecast error) entirely explains CFOs’ tight conﬁdence intervals, then the
overconﬁdence variables should not be signiﬁcant in the regression. The results in column (2)
show that both overconﬁdence variables remain negative and statistically signiﬁcant, even
after controlling for the absolute forecast error. These results are consistent with the ﬁndings
of the psychology literature, suggesting that overconﬁdence increases with accuracy (Sporer,
Penrod, Read, and Cutler 1995) and expertise (Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen 1986, Paese
and Feuer 1991, Spense 1996). We conclude therefore that although CFO overconﬁdence is
associated with skill, our overconﬁdence variables capture genuine miscalibration.
V. A Simple Model of Overconﬁdence and Corporate
Policies
To motivate our empirical predictions, we develop a simple model of investment and ﬁnancing
decisions by overconﬁdent managers. The purpose of the model is to provide a common
framework within which to derive empirical predictions about various corporate policies. In
this section we describe the main assumptions of the model and provide intuition for its key
implications. The detailed model and calibration results are provided in Appendix B. In
Section VI we interpret our empirical results within the context of the model’s implications.
We assume that overconﬁdence aﬀects managerial judgment in two distinct ways. First,
by deﬁnition, managers who are overconﬁdent should underestimate the volatility of their
own ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows.20
20Hackbarth (2007) presents a model in which overconﬁdent managers underestimate cash ﬂow volatility.
In the presence of bankruptcy costs, this bias causes them to invest less than otherwise. Furthermore, this
bias leads them to believe that the market overvalues their ﬁrms’ equity since the equity is modeled as an
option on the ﬁrm’s assets, and thus is perceived to have a lower value when asset volatility is lower.
19Assumption 1 (Underestimation of Own Cash Flow Volatility) Overconﬁdent man-
agers underestimate the volatility of their own ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows.
Second, we argue that overconﬁdent managers use low discount rates when valuing cash
ﬂows. This eﬀect is supported by asset pricing models that link volatility and uncertainty
to expected returns. Overconﬁdent managers might use too low discount rates if they either
perceive volatility as too low,21 or if they underestimate ambiguity, i.e., they are too conﬁdent
about the business model and parameters that generate their ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows,22 or both.
Assumption 2 (Low Discount Rates) Overconﬁdent managers use lower discount rates
than unbiased managers do.
In sum, we assume that overconﬁdent managers perceive cash ﬂows as safer, and at the
same time use lower discount rates to value them. Firm policies of overconﬁdent managers,
therefore, should reﬂect these beliefs.
A. Investment Decision
The manager decides how much to invest. To an overconﬁdent manager, investment projects
seem safer than they really are, and he evaluates them with a low discount rate. Therefore,
in comparison to a less conﬁdent manager, a greater number of projects will be perceived to
have positive net present value and an overconﬁdent manager will invest more.23
21Traditional asset pricing research links investor expected returns to volatility through the market price
of risk (e.g., Rubinstein 1973), as long as investors care about this risk. In the case of ﬁrms, managers should
care about whether cash ﬂows are systematic or idiosyncratic because they have underdiversiﬁed human
capital invested in their ﬁrms and they usually hold undiversiﬁable equity stakes.
22Recent theoretical models in asset pricing argue that agents demand a higher risk premium when they
are not sure about the model or parameters that generate returns (e.g., Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent
2000, Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and Williams 2002, Hansen and Sargent 2001, Epstein and Schneider 2002,
Maenhout 2004). Hence, lower ambiguity is associated with lower expected returns.
23The hypothesis between the relation between overconﬁdence and degree of investment is consistent with
the ﬁnding of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) that lab subjects are likely to enter into a business market when
payoﬀs are linked to their abilities. An alternative, non-mutual exclusive, explanation for why some ﬁrms
invest more than others is related to managerial agency costs and empire building (Jensen 1986).
20Proposition 1 (Overinvestment) Overconﬁdent managers invest more than less conﬁ-
dent managers.
Furthermore, the manager believes that the cumulative value of his ﬁrm’s projects is
higher than what outside investors believe.
Proposition 2 (Overvaluation) Overconﬁdent managers perceive the value of investment
projects as being higher than outside investors perceive them to be.
B. Financing Decision
Next, the manager decides about the capital structure of his ﬁrm. He believes that investors
underestimate the value of projects, and as a consequence incorrectly price the ﬁrm’s secu-
rities. Since there are no frictions in our setting (e.g., bankruptcy costs, agency costs, taxes,
etc.), the manager attempts to maximize current shareholder wealth by exploiting perceived
market mispricings. The model implies that at the chosen leverage, the manager perceives
his ﬁrm’s equity to be undervalued by the market.24
Proposition 3 (Overvaluation of Equity) Overconﬁdent managers believe that their ﬁrms’
equity is undervalued by the market.
In our setting the eﬀects of overconﬁdence on capital structure and payout decisions
rely primarily on the balance of two eﬀects of overconﬁdence (underestimation of volatility,
and overvaluation of cash ﬂows due to low discount rate), and the overall eﬀect ultimately
depends on the parameter values. Using standard modeling assumptions in Appendix B, we
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of low discount rates dominates the eﬀect of underestimated volatility
for the parameter values that are commonly used in the literature. Hence, the following
propositions hold for reasonable choice of parameters.
The model generates several results regarding capital structure and payout policies. Since
external securities seem expensive, an overconﬁdent manager prefers to use internal cash
24In a survey of CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2006) ﬁnd that most executives believe that their ﬁrms’
equity is undervalued by the market.
21ﬁrst to ﬁnance the ﬁrm’s investment. Therefore, overconﬁdent managers hoard cash by not
distributing cash dividends.
Proposition 4 (Fewer Dividends) Overconﬁdent managers are less likely to pay out cash
dividends.
Furthermore, among external ﬁnancing choices the manager chooses more debt as over-
conﬁdence increases. This happens because the manager perceives the ﬁrm’s equity as un-
dervalued to a degree that intensiﬁes with overconﬁdence. This also causes the manager to
borrow more in order to exploit the perceived mispricing by repurchasing shares.
Proposition 5 (High Leverage) Debt leverage increases with managerial overconﬁdence.
Proposition 6 (Share Repurchases) Overconﬁdent managers engage in more share re-
purchases.
VI. Does Overconﬁdence Aﬀect Corporate Policies?
A. The Eﬀects of Overconﬁdence on Managerial Judgement
A.1. Do Overconﬁdent Managers Underestimate Their Own Firms’ Cash Flow
Volatility?
Our tests examine the eﬀects of managerial overconﬁdence on corporate policies. To do
so, we assume that our S&P 500 overconﬁdence variables are reasonable proxies for CFOs’
overconﬁdence about their own ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows (Assumption (1)).25 We begin by testing
directly whether this is a reasonable assumption.
25An extensive literature in psychology and in experimental economics examines whether biases like over-
conﬁdence spill over from one domain into others. West and Stanovich (1997) ﬁnd that overconﬁdence
regarding motor skills is correlated with overconﬁdence regarding cognitive skills. Glaser and Weber (2007)
present a study in which overconﬁdence is measured in several ways, such as by diﬀerent types of miscalibra-
tion questions. The authors ﬁnd that respondents who exhibit overconﬁdence in stock market forecasts are
likely to exhibit overconﬁdence in general knowledge questions. Several studies document that individual
degrees of overconﬁdence are stable within tasks (forecasting, in our case), e.g., Glaser, Langer, and Weber
22In the 2007Q2 survey, we ask CFOs to provide mean estimates and 10th and 90th per-
centiles for return distributions of their own ﬁrms’ investments in the following year:
“For the investments that your company makes this year, what do you expect
the internal rate of return (IRR) to be?
- There is a 1-in-10 chance that the actual IRR will be less than %
- I expect the IRR to be %
- There is a 1-in-10 chance that the actual IRR will be greater than %”
In addition, we survey respondents about the degree to which they personally aﬀect invest-
ment decisions in their ﬁrms on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot).
We transform the responses for the IRR question to an own-ﬁrm overconﬁdence measure
pursuing the same procedure as in Section II.B (OverconﬁdenceIRR). As with the S&P 500-
based overconﬁdence variables, this variable reﬂects perceived volatility of own-ﬁrm returns,
controlling for the level of expected returns.
Next, we test whether OverconﬁdenceIRR is correlated with our S&P 500-based overconﬁ-
dence variables. Such a correlation would suggest that our primary overconﬁdence variables
are reasonable proxies for own ﬁrm overconﬁdence. In Table VI, Panel A, column (1),
OverconﬁdenceIRR is regressed on the S&P 500-based short-term and long-term overconﬁ-
dence variables, the S&P 500-based optimism variables, and industry controls. The results
indicate that ﬁrm-based overconﬁdence is signiﬁcantly correlated with S&P 500-based over-
conﬁdence. IRR-based overconﬁdence has a sensitivity of 0.32 and 0.16 for short-term and
long-term S&P 500-based overconﬁdence, respectively (t = 7.7 and t = 2.5, respectively).
Hence, our S&P 500-based overconﬁdence variables appear to be reasonable proxies for own-
(2005), Klayman, Soll, Gonz´ ales-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999), Jonsson and Allwood (2003). These studies
show that although people sometimes exhibit diﬀerent levels of overconﬁdence across domains, their relative
ranking varies as expected across domains. While many studies ﬁnd that overconﬁdence spills over from
one domain to another, others ﬁnd weak or no carryover eﬀects. For example, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and
Pouget (2005) ﬁnd that although in there is some evidence that overconﬁdence carries over across domains
(subjects that are classiﬁed as miscalibrated perform worse in a trading game), in other cases, the link does
not exist (there is no relation between miscalibration score and trading volume).
Carryover eﬀects are found also in empirical economics. For example, Puri and Robinson (2007) ﬁnd
that people with optimistic beliefs about their life-span also make optimistic economic decisions, e.g., they
are more likely to be self-employed and tilt their portfolios towards individual stocks.
23ﬁrm managerial overconﬁdence. We use the S&P 500 overconﬁdence variables in the rest of
our analysis.
A.2. Do Overconﬁdent Managers Use Low Discount Rates?
Assumption (2) postulates that overconﬁdent managers use low discount rates to value future
cash ﬂows. Graham and Harvey (2001) report that most ﬁrms invest when their company’s
expected IRR is greater than its discount/hurdle rate. It therefore follows that companies
with lower discount/hurdle rates will have lower average IRR on their portfolio of invest-
ments. Cross-sectionally, we expect IRR and discount rates to be positively correlated. We
therefore use the CFOs’ expected IRR from current investments as a proxy for the discount
rates that they use. This allows us to examine the reasonableness of Assumption (2) that
overconﬁdent managers use low discount rates (i.e., low IRR) by regressing the self-reported
IRR on overconﬁdence and optimism variables, and on industry controls.
The results in Table VI, Panel A, columns (2) and (3), show that self-reported IRR is
signiﬁcantly higher for optimistic managers and lower for overconﬁdent managers. In column
(2), the entire sample is used in the regression, while in column (3) the sample is restricted
to respondents who report that they are involved in investment decisions (5, 6, or 7 on the
investment involvement question). As expected, managers who believe that the S&P 500
will perform well also predict that their ﬁrm’s IRR will be higher. A shift from the median
to the top decile of short-term optimism increases IRR by 1.0% (t = 3.5) to 1.4% (t = 2.1),
in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
Importantly, overconﬁdent managers provide lower IRR forecasts, which we argue is re-
ﬂective of overconﬁdent managers using lower discount rates. When the entire sample is con-
sidered (column (2)), a shift from the median to the top decile of short-term overconﬁdence
is associated with IRR falling by 1.4% (t = −3.7). When only managers who are actively
involved in investment decisions are considered, the same shift in short-term overconﬁdence
results in IRR falling by 1.7% (t = −3.4), and a similar shift in long-term overconﬁdence
results in another decline of 1.0% in IRR (t = −1.3). Assuming that ﬁrms invest according to
24a hurdle rate rule, and therefore own-ﬁrm IRR would be correlated with the ﬁrms’ discount
rate, these results are consistent with our modeling assumption that overconﬁdent managers
use lower discount rates (Assumption (2)).
B. Investment Policy
The model predicts that corporate investment increases with managerial overconﬁdence, and
that marginal investments destroy value in the eyes of investors (Propositions (1) and (2)).
We test these propositions in Table VI, Panel A, columns (4) to (6).26
Overall, ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers invest more in capital expenditures in gen-
eral (column (4)), and make more acquisitions in particular (column (5)). Both capital
expenditures and acquisition intensity increase with long-term overconﬁdence (t = 3.0 and
t = 2.4, respectively) but not with short-term overconﬁdence, possibly because investments
are generally long-term decisions. To quantify the eﬀect, moving from the median to the top
decile of long-term overconﬁdence increases capital expenditures by about 1.5% (the mean
of capex intensity across sample ﬁrms is 8.0%). Note that no optimism-related variable is
statistically signiﬁcant, highlighting the importance of our overconﬁdence measure in the
decision making process.
We further investigate the relation between CFO overconﬁdence and the characteristics
of mergers executed by their ﬁrms. In column (6) of Table VI, we analyze market reaction to
merger announcements. For each observation in our sample we identify announced mergers
from Thomson SDC Platinum (minimum size $1m) according to the date nearest to the
survey date, restricting the date-diﬀerence to, at most, two years. The regression includes
controls for the method of payment (stock or cash), whether the merger is diversifying or
26All our corporate policy regressions contain a similar set of controls for the known determinants of such
policies. Speciﬁcally, our controls include collateral (measured as the portion of tangible assets out of total
assets), logged ﬁrm value, asset market-to-book, book leverage, proﬁtability, ﬁve-year past sales growth,
12-month past returns, a dividend-payer dummy, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and survey date ﬁxed eﬀects. In
addition, we include the S&P 500 optimism variables and ﬁrm and U.S. optimism variables. We believe that
these variables control for common determinants of corporate policies, including for growth opportunities
that could be correlated with overconﬁdence. Furthermore, to maintain consistency with the corporate
ﬁnance literature, we exclude utilities and ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the sample. In a robustness test, we conﬁrm
that our results qualitatively hold for the entire sample of ﬁrms.
25not (according to whether the acquirers’ 2-digit SICs match the targets’ 2-digit SICs), and
the log of transaction value.
Our results show that merger plans by ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers are nega-
tively received by the market. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CFOs experience lower
announcement returns (3-day cumulative returns) at an economically and statistically sig-
niﬁcant magnitude. A shift from the median to the top decile of long-term overconﬁdence
reduces bidder announcement returns by −1.3% (t = −2.1) (mean announcement returns
are 0.8%).27
Overall, the results indicated in Table VI, Panel A, support the main assumption and
propositions of the model, and are consistent with overconﬁdent managers using lower dis-
count rates, and investing more on average. Their acquisitions are also poorly received by
the market.28
C. Dividend Policy
The model implies that overconﬁdent managers distribute fewer cash dividends because
they prefer using internal resources to ﬁnance investments (Proposition (4)). We test this
proposition in Table VI, Panel B, columns (1) and (2). In column (1), we test whether
dividends are lower for ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers. We perform a probit regression
of a dividend payer dummy on the overconﬁdence and optimism variables, in addition to the
usual controls. Consistent with Proposition (4), the results in column (1) indicate that ﬁrms
with overconﬁdent managers are less likely to distribute dividends. The eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant and economically important. A shift for the average ﬁrm from the median of the
27Malmendier and Tate (2007) report a similar eﬀect on acquisition announcement returns for ﬁrms with
CEOs who do not exercise their executive options, and who are described as “optimistic” and “conﬁdent”
in the press. Our results are also consistent with Doukas and Petmezas (2007) who ﬁnd that acquirers who
engage in a high number of acquisitions in a short period of time appear to destroy value.
28In an untabulated analysis we test whether our results are stronger for ﬁrms with high market beta.
These ﬁrms should have stronger results, because S&P 500-based overconﬁdence should proxy better for
own-ﬁrm-based overconﬁdence among ﬁrms with cash ﬂows that vary more closely with the market. The
estimated signs of the interactions of overconﬁdence and market beta match the predicted signs for most
part, and they are generally statistically signiﬁcant. The results are available upon request.
26distribution of overconﬁdence to the top decile results in a 10.5% decrease in the propensity
to distribute dividends.
In column (2), we test the link between investments and dividends, as implied by Proposi-
tion (4). In particular, the proposition implies that overconﬁdent managers are less likely to
pay dividends because they hoard cash for future investments. Hence, the eﬀect of overconﬁ-
dence on dividend policy should be particularly evident as it interacts with investment deci-
sions. We test this conjecture by regressing the dividend payer indicator on an interaction of
capex intensity with overconﬁdence variables. The results show that the main eﬀect of long-
term overconﬁdence is no longer signiﬁcant, and almost the entire eﬀect of overconﬁdence
on dividends is due to the interaction between capital expenditures and overconﬁdence.29
Hence, this result is consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers
do not distribute dividends so that they can instead use internal cash to fund investments.
D. Leverage and Debt Maturity
The model predicts that overconﬁdent managers are predisposed to high leverage (Propo-
sition (5)). To test this proposition, we regress book-leverage on a set of right-hand side
variables similar to those used in the previous tests. The results in Table VI, Panel B,
column (3), indicate that short-term and long-term overconﬁdence variables are positively
related to debt leverage (t = 2.7 and t = 0.5, respectively), consistent with Prediction (5).
To illustrate the economic magnitude of the eﬀect, a shift from the median to the top decile
of short-term overconﬁdence increases debt leverage ratios by about 2.3% (average leverage
in our sample is 21.8%). This result provides a possible explanation for Frank and Goyal’s
(2007) ﬁnding that CFOs have individual preferences for their corporations’ debt leverage.
29To ensure that the eﬀect we document is not driven by a mechanical relationship between dividend
payout and investments (paying dividends means that there are less funds for investments), we repeat this
test with a repurchases dummy as a left hand variable. Consistent with our model but inconsistent with a
mechanical explanation, we ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant relation between repurchase policy and investment
policy interacted with overconﬁdence variables. Results are untabulated due to brevity and are available
upon request.
27In addition, we examine how debt maturity varies with overconﬁdence. If future cash
ﬂows are perceived as safe, then managers may be willing to commit to longer debt maturities.
We test this hypothesis in column (4). We construct a variable that measures the portion of
long-term debt (above one year in maturity) out of total debt (LT debt/Total debt) and use it
as the dependent variable. The coeﬃcients on both overconﬁdence variables are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. An increase from the median to the top decile in each overconﬁdence
variable is associated with a higher share of long-term debt by 3.2% (t = 2.0) and 4.7%
(t = 2.8), for short-term and long-term overconﬁdence, respectively. (The mean proportion
of long-term debt out of total debt is 76.8%.) Thus, overconﬁdence is associated with
committing more heavily to debt, and in particular, to long-term debt.
E. Share Repurchases
According to the model, overconﬁdent managers repurchase shares when they perceive that
equity is undervalued by the market (Proposition (6)). In Table VI, Panel B, column (5), we
use probit regressions to test whether repurchases are associated with CFO overconﬁdence.
The table indicates that ﬁrms with overconﬁdent managers are more likely to repurchase
shares than are ﬁrms with less conﬁdent managers. The eﬀect is statistically and economi-
cally signiﬁcant. A shift for the average ﬁrm from the median of the distribution of long-term
overconﬁdence to the top decile results in an increase of 6.5% in the propensity to engage in
repurchases. (The average propensity to repurchase shares is 41.6%.)
VII. Conclusion
We provide new evidence and novel insights about the relation between the behavioral biases
of managers and corporate policies. Our study is based on a unique data set of stock market
predictions by top ﬁnancial executives collected over a span of more than six years. Our
survey measures overconﬁdence as the degree of miscalibration of beliefs, a method that has
been exclusively used before in laboratory experiments. Our data set is distinct because we
28have direct measures of both overconﬁdence and optimism for a large number of top U.S.
executives, and because we can link our estimates to archival data and thus examine the
relation between overconﬁdence and corporate actions.
We ﬁnd that CFOs are miscalibrated on average: only 38% of stock market realizations
fall within the 80% conﬁdence intervals that executives provide. Conﬁdence intervals are
especially narrow following high stock market returns because managers condition their
lower conﬁdence bound on past stock market performance. Moreover, our results indicate
that miscalibration depends on personal traits (skill), in addition to corporate characteristics.
Our analysis links managerial overconﬁdence (measured as miscalibration) to corporate
policies. First, we argue that a ﬁrst-order eﬀect of overconﬁdence on corporate decision
making is that overconﬁdent managers use low discount rates when valuing future cash
ﬂows. We ﬁnd that overconﬁdent managers do indeed invest in projects with lower IRRs.
Second, we ﬁnd a strong correlation between overconﬁdence based on S&P 500 forecasts
and overconﬁdence based on own-ﬁrm IRR forecasts. These results support our use of S&P
500-based overconﬁdence variables as reasonable proxies for own-ﬁrm overconﬁdence, and is
consistent with the psychology and economics literature about the spillover of biases from
one domain to another.
While previous research provides evidence that behavioral biases exist, we show these bi-
ases are prevalent even among top corporate decision makers. More importantly, we establish
a link between behavioral biases and corporate ﬁnancial actions. Firms with overconﬁdent
CFOs invest more and engage in more acquisitions. Moreover, overconﬁdent managers are
less likely to pay dividends, instead using the funds to make investments. We also ﬁnd a
relation between managerial overconﬁdence and capital structure: ﬁrms with overconﬁdent
CFOs have higher debt ratios and rely more heavily on long-term debt.
There is no role for overconﬁdence in standard models of ﬁrm behavior. Our evidence
that overconﬁdence impacts a wide range of corporate policies implies that it is time to
consider overconﬁdence as an integral modeling assumption, rather than just an interesting
psychological curiosity.
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33Appendix A: Variable Deﬁnitions
Variables from CFO Survey
Raw short-term forecast Survey response of expected one-year S&P 500 return.
Raw long-term forecast Survey response of expected ten-year S&P 500 return.
Raw lower (upper) bounds Survey response for the level of S&P 500 returns for which
there is a 1-in-10 chance of being lower (greater). Applies to
short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) returns.
abs(forecast error) Absolute value of the forecast error (forecasted returns minus
realized returns).
Individual volatility (Raw upper bound - raw lower bound) / 2.65. Applies to
short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) forecasts.
Disagreement volatility Standard deviation of mean forecasts (expected returns) within
survey date. Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-term
(ten-year) forecasts.
Optimism ST Decile ranking of individual short-term expected returns
within each survey date. Orthogonalized with respect to
Overconﬁdence ST. Variable is scaled between 0 and 1.
Optimism LT Decile ranking of individual short-term expected returns
within each survey date. Orthogonalized with respect to
Overconﬁdence ST and Optimism ST. Variable is scaled be-
tween 0 and 1.
Overconﬁdence ST Decile ranking of individual volatility of short-term forecasts
within each survey date and forecast decile (i.e., double sorting
on short-term optimism). Ranking is scaled between 0 and 1,
and sorted in descending order so that 0 (1) reﬂects the decile
of least (most) overconﬁdent managers.
Overconﬁdence LT Decile ranking of individual volatility of long-term forecasts
within each survey date and forecast decile (i.e., double sorting
on raw long-term optimism). Orthogonalized with respect to
Overconﬁdence ST. Ranking is scaled between 0 and 1, and
sorted in descending order so that 0 (1) reﬂects the decile of
least (most) overconﬁdent managers.
Optimism ﬁrm Raw response to a question about how optimistic managers are
about their ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial future (responses range from 0 to
100). Variable is decile-ranked within survey date and scaled
between 0 and 1.
Optimism U.S. Raw response to a question about how optimistic managers are
about the future of the U.S. economy (responses range from
0 to 100). Variable is decile-ranked within survey date and
scaled between 0 and 1.
IRR Internal rate of returns (IRR) as predicted by survey respon-
dents (in 2007 Q2 survey). Measured in percentage points.
OverconﬁdenceIRR Decile ranking of individual volatility derived from IRR fore-
casts within each IRR forecast decile (i.e., double sorting on
IRR levels). Ranking is scaled between 0 and 1, and sorted in
descending order so that 0 (1) reﬂects the decile of least (most)
overconﬁdent managers.
34Variables from CRSP
Age Firm age in years. Calculated as years elapsed since ﬁrst
appearance on CRSP.
12-month cumulative returns Cumulative value-weighted monthly returns over 12
months. Applied to market and ﬁrm returns.
Merger announcement re-
turns (-1,1)
Cumulative three-day returns of acquirers around merger
announcements. Announcement dates are from Thomson
SDC Platinum.
Variables from The Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) An index for the implied volatility on 30-day options. The
index is constructed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) from a wide range of wide range of S&P 500 (S&P 100
until August 2003) index options (both calls and puts). The
index reﬂects the anticipated volatility in the next 30 days. See
http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf for further
details.
Variables from Annual Compustat
Sales Annual sales in millions of USD (item 12).
5-year Sales growth Annualized 5-years sales (item 12) growth.
Book leverage Total debt / total assets at book values = (long-term debt
(item 9) + debt in current liabilities (item 34)) / total assets
at book value (item 6).
Asset Market-to-book (M/B) Total assets at market values / total assets at book values =
(share price (item 199) * #shares (item 54) + debt in current
liabilities (item 34) + long-term debt (item 9) + preferred-
liquidation value (item 10) - deferred taxes and investment
tax credit (item 35)) / total assets (item 6).
LT debt / Total debt Portion of long-term debt (item 9) out of total debt (item 9 +
item 34).
Proﬁtability Operating proﬁt (item 13) / lag(total assets (item 6)).
Collateral Tangible assets / total assets at book values = (plant property
& equipment (item 8) + inventory (item 3)) / total assets (item
6).
Dividends 1 if declared dividends (item 21), and 0 otherwise.
Repurchases 1 if purchase of common and preferred stock (item 115) is
greater than 1% of equity, and zero otherwise.
Capital expenditures (capex)
intensity
Net investments / lag(total assets at book values) = (capital
expenditures (item 128) + increase in investments (item 113) +
acquisitions (item 129) - sales of property, plant and equipment
(item 107) - sale of investments (item 109)) / lag(total assets
(item 6)).
Acquisitions intensity Acquisitions (item 129) / lag(total assets (item 6)).
35Appendix B: Model of Overconﬁdence and Corporate
Policies
A. Investment Decision
In the model, an overconﬁdent manager decides on the number of projects that his ﬁrm will
invest in. Each project requires a $1 investment and produces gross return Ri in the next
period. Project returns are diminishing in their order, so that project i+1 is less proﬁtable
than project i: E[Ri] ≥ E[Ri+1]. For simplicity, we assume that project realizations are
independent. Furthermore, we assume that there are no frictions such as taxes, agency
costs, bankruptcy costs, or transaction costs. Therefore, the manager chooses the number






1 + ˆ r
− I (1)
s.t. I ≥ 0 ; E[Ri] ≥ E[Ri+1],
where I is the total investment in projects and ˆ r is the discount rate that the manager uses.
(Investors use r > ˆ r to discount the cash ﬂows.)
Because overconﬁdent managers use lower discount rates, they invest in more projects.
Given that project outcomes are uncorrelated and expected returns are diminishing, the last
project that the overconﬁdent manager chooses (project ˆ I) satisﬁes E[Rˆ I] ≥ 1+ˆ r. Since the
overconﬁdent manager uses lower discount rates ˆ r < r and since projects’ expected returns
are diminishing with the number of projects E[Ri] ≥ E[Ri+1], the overconﬁdent manager
invests at least as much as an unbiased manager would. In other words, the overconﬁdent
manager believes that some negative NPV projects are actually proﬁtable and as a result
invests in them:
Proposition 1 (Overinvestment) Overconﬁdent managers invest more than less conﬁ-
dent managers.
36The manager disagrees with the market not only about the optimal number of projects,
but also about their cumulative fair value. The total value of the ˆ I projects, according to
the manager’s perception, is higher than the total value of projects that investors perceive:
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− ˆ I = V (ˆ I),
where ˆ V (ˆ I) and V (ˆ I) represent the value of the ﬁrm with overinvestment, as perceived by
the overconﬁdent manager and by investors, respectively.
Proposition 2 (Overvaluation) Overconﬁdent managers perceive the value of investment
projects as being higher than outside investors perceive them to be.
B. Financing Decision
Given that the overconﬁdent manager decides to invest ˆ I in projects, he next decides about
the capital structure of the ﬁrm. At the outset, the ﬁrm’s balance sheet is composed of cash
(B) and equity (allocated into s shares). Projects can be ﬁnanced with b cash (out of B
available to the ﬁrm), with newly issued debt with face value F and market value D(F),
and with s0 newly issued shares. Since the manager and outside investors disagree about the
value of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial claims, the manager maximizes current shareholder value and
attempts to proﬁt from market perceived mispricings, subject to raising suﬃcient funds to
ﬁnance the projects:
max




E(F) − ˆ E(F)

(2)
s.t. b + D(F) +
s0
s + s0E(F) ≥ ˆ I
0 ≤ b ≤ B ; F ≥ 0 ; s
0 > −s,
where D and E are market values of the debt and equity claims, respectively. ˆ D and ˆ E
represent these values as perceived by the manager.
37Because the overconﬁdent manager always perceives his ﬁrm’s assets (i.e., the current
value of the project) to be more valuable than investors believe them to be, he prefers to
use internal funds ﬁrst, i.e., b = B. Also he would use external funds to the extent that
his misperception of the projects’ net present value outweighs his misperception of security
mispricing. Therefore, he raises the minimum funds necessary, but not more than that. The
minimum ﬁnancing constraint is hence binding: B + D + s0
s+s0E = ˆ I.
After substituting the constraint into the objective function and using the accounting










ˆ V (ˆ I) − ˆ I + B

(3)
s.t. F ≥ 0.
The only variables in the objective function that are aﬀected by the choice of the face
value F are the equity valuations ˆ E and E. Thus, the debt level that maximizes perceived
shareholder value occurs when the ratio
ˆ E(F)
E(F) is maximized. In other words, at the chosen
capital structure, the manager believes that the market undervalues the ﬁrm’s equity the
most.
To determine in what situations the manager perceives the value of the equity as un-
dervalued by the market in absolute terms, i.e.,
ˆ E(F)
E(F) > 1, we put more structure on the
problem and calibrate the model. We assume that both the overconﬁdent manager and
outside investors use the Merton (1974) framework to value corporate claims.31 However,
the investors use diﬀerent parameters to value corporate claims than does the overconﬁdent
manager. Outside investors believe that the current value of the ﬁrm’s assets is V (ˆ I) and
that the volatility of cash ﬂows is σ. Conversely, the manager uses parameters based on his
perception of cash ﬂow volatility: ˆ V (ˆ I) and ˆ σ, respectively, i.e., higher asset value and lower
cash ﬂow volatility.
30Full mathematical derivation is available upon request.
31In Merton’s model the ﬁrm’s equity is priced as a call option on the ﬁrm’s assets, and zero-coupon debt
is priced as a riskless bond minus the value of a put option on the ﬁrm’s assets. There are no frictions such
as taxes, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, or transaction costs.
38In the Merton model, equity is valued as a call option on the ﬁrm’s assets with a strike
equal to the face value of debt. Lower volatility has two eﬀects on the price of equity in this
framework. First, volatility has a direct eﬀect through the volatility component of the call
option, i.e., lower volatility means a lower call option price. Second, lower volatility increases
the value of the option indirectly, through the value of the underlying asset. Lower volatility
results in lower discount rates, which in turn increase the present value of discounted cash
ﬂows, i.e., the option’s underlying asset worth is more.
The ratio
ˆ E(F)
E(F) is therefore greater than 1 when the indirect eﬀect of low volatility is
greater than its direct eﬀect. While other option parameters matter (such as interest rates
and duration), we ﬁnd that this ratio is mostly sensitive to the degree in which volatility
aﬀects discount rates. If volatility is assumed not to have an eﬀect on discount rates (as in
Hackbarth (2007)), then
ˆ E(F)
E(F) is less than 1, i.e., the manager believes that the stock market
overvalues his ﬁrm’s equity. However, even a weak positive relation between volatility and
discount rates causes
ˆ E(F)
E(F) to be greater than 1, since the valuation of call options is very
sensitive to the value of the underlying asset.
In the calibration we assume that the ﬁrm can invest any amount I in projects with
linearly diminishing returns E[Ri] = 5 − i.32 The investment required for each project is
$1.00. For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrm can also invest in fractional projects. The
volatility of cash ﬂows is σ = 0.60,33 although, the overconﬁdent manager perceives the
volatility as lower by a factor of 3, as documented earlier in this paper, i.e., ˆ σ = 0.20.
We follow the traditional asset pricing models and assume that volatility is related to
discount rates in a linear fashion: r = λσ, where the market price of risk, λ, is set to be
0.37.34 Therefore, the overconﬁdent manager discounts cash ﬂows with ˆ r = 0.07 instead of
r = 0.22. Additional assumptions are that the risk free rate is rf = 0.05, the investment
horizon is one year, and the ﬁrm’s assets initially consist of $1.00 cash (B).
32This is an arbitrary linear functional form. Linear functions facilitate the calculation, but should not
aﬀect the generalization of the results.
33Volatility of individual ﬁrms typically range between 50% to 100% per annum.
34Fama and French (2002) estimate the market price of risk (Sharpe ratio) as 0.31 for 1872 to 2000 and
0.44 for the period of 1951 to 2000. In our calibration we use the estimate employed by Basak and Cuoco
(1998).
39Using these parameters, we calculate that the manager invests more than an unbiased
manager optimally would (by 2.9%)35 and that he overvalues the projects by 10.0% more
than the market does.36 The manager ﬁnances the investment ﬁrst with cash, and raises debt
in order to cover the remainder of the investment and to repurchase shares. The manager
chooses the leverage that maximizes the perceived gains from exploiting perceived market
mispricings, i.e., the chosen debt face value ($4.91) maximizes the discrepancy in valuations
between investors’ valuation and his private valuation of issued securities (Equation 2). At
this debt face value, the manager perceives the ﬁrm’s equity as the most undervalued by
the market (Equation 3),
ˆ E(F)




With this set of parameters, we ﬁnd that as long as the price of risk, λ, is above 0.01,
the ratio
ˆ E(F)
E(F) is greater than 1, i.e., the manager perceives the ﬁrm’s equity as undervalued
by the market:37
Proposition 3 (Overvaluation of Equity) Overconﬁdent managers believe that their ﬁrms’
equity is undervalued by the market.
Since external ﬁnancing seems expensive, the overconﬁdent manager prefers to ﬁnance
investments with internal cash, and therefore does not distribute dividends before investing
in the project.
Proposition 4 (Fewer Dividends) Overconﬁdent managers are less likely to pay out cash
dividends.
Figure A1 presents the manager’s value function from issuing securities (Equation 2) as
a function of debt leverage (D/V (ˆ I)). The diﬀerent curves represent overconﬁdence degrees
ranging from ˆ σ = 0.60 (unbiased) to ˆ σ = 0.10 (extremely overconﬁdent); an overconﬁdence
35While the overconﬁdent manager overinvests ˆ I = $3.93, an unbiased manager invests I∗ = $3.78.
36The overconﬁdent manager perceives the gross value of the investment as ˆ V (ˆ I) = $9.76, while the market
values it at V (ˆ I) = $11.10.
37Debt is perceived undervalued by the market as long as λ > 0, although to a lesser extent than equity
is (see discussion of calibration charts below).
40level of ˆ σ = 0.20 is represented with a black marked line. The ﬁgure shows that while
the value function of unbiased managers (σ = 0.60) is insensitive to debt leverage, optimal
leverage increases with managerial overconﬁdence (optimal leverage is marked with small
open black circles). While a manager with a mild overconﬁdence level of ˆ σ = 0.50 chooses
an optimal leverage 0.32, a manager who is more overconﬁdent, ˆ σ = 0.20, chooses an optimal
leverage 0.46.
Furthermore, the ﬁgure shows that although overconﬁdent managers are predisposed
to higher leverage, at some point additional leverage is perceived to be value-decreasing.
This happens because at high leverage, market valuation of equity is not perceived as being
undervalued, while debt is perceived to be undervalued by the market. Therefore, the optimal
leverage for overconﬁdent managers is within the middle range, even without an explicit
oﬀsetting eﬀect (e.g., bankruptcy costs).
Figure A2a shows the discrepancy between the manager’s subjective valuation and the
market valuation of equity, as a function of debt leverage. The ﬁgure demonstrates that the
chosen leverage is set at the point in which the discrepancy in equity valuations between
the manager and the market is the greatest (Equation (3)). Figure A2b shows a similar
chart for debt. At the optimal leverage ratio, the overconﬁdent manager believes that debt
is undervalued by the market, although to a lesser extent than equity.
The calibration yields two additional results. The manager chooses debt leverage that
increases with the level of overconﬁdence. The intuition is that at low and medium leverage
levels, the overconﬁdent manager believes that investors undervalue his ﬁrms’ equity more
than they undervalue his ﬁrms’ debt. Since the manager tries to exploit market mispricing,
as overconﬁdence increases, he wishes to borrow more in order to repurchase more seemingly
undervalued shares.
Proposition 5 (High Leverage) Debt leverage increases with managerial overconﬁdence.
Proposition 6 (Share Repurchases) Overconﬁdent managers engage in more share re-
purchases.
41In a robustness test we ﬁnd that Propositions (5) and (6) depend on the relation between
volatility and discount rates. In particular, we ﬁnd that these propositions hold, as long as
the market price of risk, λ, is greater than 0.09. Since this value is far below all estimations
of the market price of risk in the literature, we believe that Propositions (5) and (6) are
generalizable. When λ > 0.09, and as overconﬁdence increases, the overconﬁdent manager
believes that his ﬁrm’s equity is undervalued by the market to a greater extent. This happens
because the positive eﬀect of low perceived volatility on the equity valuation (lower discount
rates) dominates its negative eﬀect (safer assets).
42Figure A1. Perceived Value from Issuing Securities and Optimal Leverage
Value derived from issuing securities as perceived by overconﬁdent managers, as a function
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σ-hat = σ = 0.6, r-hat = 0.22
σ-hat = 0.5, r-hat = 0.19
σ-hat = 0.4, r-hat = 0.15
σ-hat = 0.3, r-hat = 0.11
σ-hat = 0.2, r-hat = 0.07
σ-hat = 0.1, r-hat = 0.04
Figure A2. Securities Overvaluation by Overconﬁdent Managers
Figure A2a. The ratio of the value of equity as perceived by overconﬁdent managers to
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σ-hat = σ = 0.6, r-hat = 0.22
σ-hat = 0.5, r-hat = 0.19
σ-hat = 0.4, r-hat = 0.15
σ-hat = 0.3, r-hat = 0.11
σ-hat = 0.2, r-hat = 0.07
σ-hat = 0.1, r-hat = 0.04
Figure A2b. The ratio of the value of debt as perceived by overconﬁdent managers to the
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σ-hat = σ = 0.6, r-hat = 0.22
σ-hat = 0.5, r-hat = 0.19
σ-hat = 0.4, r-hat = 0.15
σ-hat = 0.3, r-hat = 0.11
σ-hat = 0.2, r-hat = 0.07
σ-hat = 0.1, r-hat = 0.04
43Table I
Summary Statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample ﬁrms. Panel A presents summary statistics for the
variables used in the study. Panel B presents an industry and size breakdown according to the CFOs’
own reporting. Panel C compares the distribution of key attributes of the sample ﬁrms to those from the
Compustat universe from 2001 to 2006. The columns represent Compustat quintiles, and the numbers
report the percentage of sample observations that fall within each quintile. Variable deﬁnitions are provided
in Appendix A.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Survey Variables (Full Sample) Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Raw forecasts ST (%) 6901 6.40 3.82 -15.00 6.00 25.00
Individual volatility ST (%) 6901 4.89 3.57 0.38 3.77 26.42
Conﬁdence interval ST (%) 6901 13.02 9.78 0.09 10.00 100.00
Optimism ST 6901 0.50 0.31 0.00 0.56 1.00
Overconﬁdence ST 6901 0.50 0.31 0.00 0.56 1.00
Raw forecasts LT (%) 6280 7.68 2.73 1.00 8.00 40.00
Individual volatility LT (%) 6280 3.33 2.09 0.38 3.02 19.25
Conﬁdence interval LT (%) 6280 8.98 6.97 0.04 8.00 125.00
Optimism LT 6280 0.50 0.32 0.00 0.56 1.00
Overconﬁdence LT 6280 0.50 0.32 0.00 0.56 1.00
abs(forecast error ST) (%) 5158 8.52 8.11 0.00 6.35 66.00
S&P 500 realization within conﬁdence interval 5158 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Optimism ﬁrm 5360 0.51 0.32 0.00 0.56 1.00
Optimism U.S. 5403 0.51 0.31 0.00 0.56 1.00
IRR 316 13.19 6.17 2.00 12.00 40.00
OverconﬁdenceIRR 316 0.48 0.30 0.00 0.44 1.00
Firm Characteristics (for sample ﬁrms that can be linked to Compustat)
Proﬁtability 1142 0.13 0.12 -1.60 0.13 0.46
log(Sales) 1144 7.66 1.95 0.82 7.63 11.05
Asset Market-to-Book 1144 1.48 0.89 0.21 1.18 6.63
Collateral 1144 0.38 0.22 0.01 0.38 0.93
5yr Sales growth 1108 0.09 0.17 -0.32 0.07 1.42
Book leverage 1143 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.22 1.17
LT debt / Total debt 1061 0.77 0.28 0.00 0.88 1.00
Dividends 1149 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Repurchases 1149 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Capex intensity 1143 0.08 0.11 -0.21 0.05 1.23
Acquisitions intensity 1086 0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.00 1.03
Firm Characteristics (for sample ﬁrms that can be linked to CRSP)
Age (years) 1149 32.45 22.27 2.50 25.92 81.33
Firm 12-month past returns 1147 0.18 0.49 -0.91 0.13 5.23
Beta (βMKT) 1133 1.13 0.86 -0.48 0.94 4.49
Merger announcement returns (%) 375 0.83 5.16 -15.12 0.86 18.74
44Table I: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Panel B: Distribution of Responses by Industry and Size
Full Identiﬁed Full Identiﬁed
Industry Sample Sample Revenues Sample Sample
Retail / Wholesale 815 197 Less than $24m 894 63
Mining / Construction 254 52 $25 - 99m 1423 138
Manufacturing 1904 473 $100 - 499m 1929 365
Transportation / Energy 380 144 $500 - 999m 669 283
Communications / Media 316 88 $1 - 4.999bn 1059 552
Tech (Software / Biotech) 471 156 More than $5bn 578 411
Banking / Finance / Insurance 995 333
Service / Consulting 597 119
Healthcare / Pharmaceutical 291 67
Other 774 170
Total 6797 1799 Total 6552 1812
Panel C: Distribution of sample ﬁrms across Compustat quintiles
Compustat quintiles
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Age (years) 5.9 9.1 16.5 18.9 49.7
Sales 0.3 3.7 12.0 22.4 61.7
Asset Market-to-Book 13.5 28.9 24.4 23.9 9.3
Proﬁtability 1.3 13.2 29.4 32.0 24.2
5-year Sales growth 8.5 28.7 32.0 20.6 10.3
Collateral 10.7 22.5 25.4 25.2 16.2
Book leverage 10.6 20.0 30.1 30.4 8.9
LT debt / Total debt 7.9 17.6 27.5 26.5 20.6

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One-Year S&P 500 Return Forecasts vs. Realizations
The table compares survey forecasts with S&P 500 realizations by survey date. Average forecast error (%) is
deﬁned as Average one-year S&P 500 expected return (%) minus Realized one-year S&P 500 return (%) (see
deﬁnitions in Table II). S&P 500 realizations: % below 10th percentile is the percentage of respondents for
whom the realized one-year S&P 500 return is below their 10th percentile predictions. S&P 500 realizations:
% between 10th and 90th percentiles is the percentage of respondents for whom the realized one-year S&P
500 return is between their 10th percentile and 90th percentile predictions. S&P 500 realizations: % above
90th percentile is the percentage of respondents for whom the realized one-year S&P 500 return is above
their 90th percentile predictions.
S&P 500 realizations...
Average % below % between % above
forecast error 10th 10th and 90th 90th
(%) percentile percentiles percentile
Survey date (1) (2) (3) (4)
13 Mar 2001 9.0 n/a n/a n/a
11 Jun 2001 25.2 96.6 3.4 0.0
10 Sep 2001 21.2 89.0 11.0 0.0
3 Dec 2001 25.2 91.0 9.0 0.0
12 Mar 2002 38.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
4 Jun 2002 10.3 73.0 27.0 0.0
17 Sep 2002 -12.5 0.0 14.0 86.0
3 Dec 2002 -8.8 0.0 19.9 80.1
17 Mar 2003 -24.1 0.0 2.7 97.3
12 Jun 2003 -4.8 0.0 50.3 49.7
15 Sep 2003 -3.5 0.0 53.6 46.4
4 Dec 2003 -2.2 0.0 68.5 31.5
18 Mar 2004 1.5 11.9 83.2 5.0
9 Jun 2004 1.0 5.1 86.9 8.0
8 Sep 2004 -3.7 0.0 47.2 52.8
1 Dec 2004 0.4 4.9 78.9 16.2
22 Feb 2005 -2.9 0.0 61.3 38.7
24 May 2005 -0.1 3.9 82.5 13.6
28 Aug 2005 -1.8 0.0 56.5 43.5
15 Nov 2005 -8.1 0.0 19.9 80.1
23 Feb 2006 -6.3 0.0 31.8 68.2
23 May 2006 -14.9 0.0 3.8 96.2
29 Aug 2006 -6.6 0.0 23.4 76.6
Average 1.4 21.6 37.9 40.4
47Table IV
Determinants of Forecasts and Individual Volatilities
The table explores the determinants of CFO forecasts of the one-year ahead S&P 500 return and individual
volatilities. Panel A presents regressions of lower bounds, expected returns, upper bounds, and individual
volatilities on future S&P 500 returns and past returns, where standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted
for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with 7 lags. Observation units in Panel A
are the means of survey responses within a given quarter. Panel B presents results from Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions, where standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation using the Newey
and West (1987) procedure with three lags. In Panel B, the independent variables are past ﬁrm returns. In
both panels, dependent variables are expressed as decimals (not percentage points). Variable deﬁnitions are
provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Regressions of average forecasts on S&P 500 returns
One-year forecasts (%)
Lower Expected Upper Individual
bound return bound volatility
(1) FM (2) FM (3) FM (4) FM
12-months future S&P return -0.64 -1.38 -3.96** -1.25
(1.27) (0.90) (1.94) (1.06)
12-months past S&P return 11.36*** 4.44*** 0.52 -4.09***
(1.49) (1.01) (2.05) (1.12)
Intercept -1.54*** 6.37*** 12.12*** 5.16***
(0.13) (0.29) (0.46) (0.19)
Observations 22 23 22 22
R2 0.75 0.38 0.14 0.49
Panel B: Regressions of forecasts on own-ﬁrm returns (Fama-MacBeth)
One-year forecasts (%)
Lower Expected Upper Individual
bound return bound volatility
(1) FM (2) FM (3) FM (4) FM
12-months past ﬁrm return 0.47** 0.37*** 0.13 -0.10
(0.17) (0.10) (0.29) (0.12)
Intercept -1.81** 6.29*** 11.92*** 5.18***
(0.70) (0.20) (0.32) (0.33)
Average number of observations 80 83 80 80
Number of regressions 22 23 22 22
Average R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
48Table V
Skill and Overconﬁdence
The table explores the relation between CFO overconﬁdence and skill. Column (1) presents the results of a
regression of absolute forecast errors (in percentage) on overconﬁdence measures (based on a Fama-MacBeth
regression). Column (2) presents the results of a regression where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable that receives the value 1 if the S&P 500 realization is within the 10th and 90th percentiles provided
by CFOs, and 0 otherwise (Fama-MacBeth regression). Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation of
three lags using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A.
*, **, *** denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All regressions have
intercepts that are not presented.
Realization
abs(forecast error) within 10th and 90th and
(%) percentiles (0/1) ×100
(1) Fama-MacBeth (2) Fama-MacBeth
Overconﬁdence ST -0.58*** -51.01***
(0.17) (3.45)
Overconﬁdence LT -0.71*** -5.80***
(0.20) (1.84)
abs(forecast error) (%) -6.01***
(0.66)
Average number of observations 268 273
Number of regressions 18 18
Average R2 0.02 0.35
49Table VI
Overconﬁdence and Corporate Policies
The table presents results about the relation between managerial overconﬁdence and corporate policies. The
dependent variables in Panel A are overconﬁdence based on self-reported IRR (column (1)), self-reported
IRR (columns (2) and (3)), capex intensity (%) (column (4)), acquisitions intensity (%) (column (5)), and
3-day merger announcement returns (-1, 1) (column (6)). The dependent variables in Panel B are book
leverage (column (1)), LT debt
Total debt (column (2)), dividend payer dummy (columns (3) and (4)), and stock
repurchase dummy (column (5)). All regressions are OLS apart from regressions (3) to (5) in Panel B,
which are probit regressions (marginal eﬀects for the average ﬁrm are reported). Independent variables in all
regressions include Overconﬁdence ST, Overconﬁdence LT, Optimism ST, Optimism LT, Optimism ﬁrm,
Optimism U.S. The regression in Panel A, column (3), is restricted to respondents who reported that they
take an active role in the investment decision making process (5 or more out of 7). Columns (4) to (6)
in Panel A and all the columns in Panel B include ﬁrm characteristics controls: book leverage (except for
in Panel B, column (1)), collateral, log(sales), asset M/B, proﬁtability, dividends indicator (except for in
Panel B, column (3)), 5-year sales growth, and 12-month past returns. All regression include industry and
survey ﬁxed eﬀects. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects are based on nine broad industry classiﬁcations (provided by
respondents) in Panel A, columns (1) to (3), and on 2-digit SIC elsewhere. The regressions in Panel B,
columns (3) and (4), include a repurchase dummy and a capex intensity control. The regression in Panel
B, column (5) includes a dividend payer dummy. Utilities and ﬁnancial ﬁrms are excluded from the sample.
Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-tailed signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level.
Panel A: Discount Rates and Investment Decisions
IRR (%) Capex Acq’s Merger ann.
All Involved in intensity intensity returns (-1, 1)
OverconﬁdenceIRR investments (%) (%) (%)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS
Overconﬁdence ST 0.32*** -2.72*** -3.30*** -1.27 -1.03 -0.58
(0.04) (0.74) (0.98) (1.12) (1.01) (1.19)
Overconﬁdence LT 0.16** -0.28 -1.93 2.94*** 2.32** -2.56**
(0.07) (1.24) (1.48) (0.98) (0.98) (1.20)
Optimism ST 0.03 2.81*** 2.03* -0.09 -0.06 -0.35
(0.07) (0.80) (0.95) (1.22) (0.95) (1.17)
Optimism LT 0.03 -1.02 -0.66 -0.47 -0.87 2.23*
(0.05) (0.74) (1.42) (0.97) (1.08) (1.11)
Optimism ﬁrm 0.04 1.52 0.92 -0.12 -0.59 0.70
(0.06) (0.96) (1.18) (0.67) (0.57) (0.92)
Optimism U.S. 0.06 1.96 2.57 0.99 1.07 -1.81
(0.05) (1.50) (1.64) (1.27) (1.35) (1.34)
Observations 313 313 198 1104 1051 369
Adj. R2 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.36
50Table VI: Overconﬁdence and Corporate Policies (Cont.)





0/1 0/1 (%) (%) 0/1
(1) probit (2) probit (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) probit
Overconﬁdence ST 0.06 0.10 4.62*** 6.39** -0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (1.69) (3.15) (0.08)
× Capex intensity -0.64
(0.65)
Overconﬁdence LT -0.21** -0.08 0.84 9.41*** 0.13**
(0.10) (0.13) (1.57) (3.35) (0.06)
× Capex intensity -2.02***
(0.68)
Optimism ST -0.03 -0.02 0.78 -4.87 0.00
(0.07) (0.06) (1.67) (2.95) (0.10)
Optimism LT -0.01 0.01 0.55 -3.46 -0.11*
(0.08) (0.09) (1.88) (3.18) (0.07)
Optimism ﬁrm 0.02 0.03 -0.44 3.41 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (1.73) (2.93) (0.06)
Optimism U.S. 0.09 0.08 -1.92 -0.73 -0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (1.54) (2.40) (0.08)
Observations 1027 1027 1104 1023 1050
Adj. R2 (Pseudo-R2) 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.29
51Figure 1. Time-Series of CFO Miscalibration
Figure 1. The percentage of CFOs for whom S&P 500 realized returns fall in the 80%





















































































52Figure 2. Distribution of One-Year S&P 500 Volatilities
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53Figure 3. Distribution of Ten-Year S&P 500 Volatilities
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54Figure 4. Expected Returns, Conﬁdence Bounds, and Realized Returns
Figure 4. Means of expected returns, 80% conﬁdence bounds (means of lower and upper



































































































Forecasted 1-Year Returns (mean)
Realized 1-Year Returns
Forecasted 10th/90th Percentiles (mean)
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